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TPRM Consulting

Energy · part 1

What banking learned about critical suppliers, energy is about to learn

Energy regulation is following the path financial services took on critical third parties.

Clive Besterwitch, Founder and Director · Part 1 of 5

Twelve years ago, third-party risk in financial services was a compliance footnote: a vendor questionnaire, an annual review, a box ticked before an audit. Today it’s a board-level discipline with legal force behind it, and it got there through a series of defined regulatory steps. DORA has applied in the EU since 17 January 2025. In the UK, the critical third parties regime run by the Bank of England, the PRA and the FCA took effect in January 2025, and the first designations followed. The Critical Third Parties (Designation) Regulations 2026 came into force on 13 July 2026 and brought four large cloud providers under direct oversight.

In our view, energy is now on the same path, a few years behind banking.

How banking got there

It’s worth remembering how gradual the financial services journey was. First came outsourcing guidance that told firms they stayed responsible for what they outsourced. Then came expectations on registers of suppliers, contract terms, audit rights and exit plans. Then operational resilience rules asked firms to identify their important business services and the suppliers behind them, and to test whether they could stay within tolerable levels of disruption. Only after all of that did regulators take powers to oversee the most critical suppliers directly.

At each step, firms that had treated the previous step as a paperwork exercise found the next one harder. Firms that had built a real understanding of their dependencies found each step easier, because the questions kept building on the same foundation.

What has already happened in energy

On 28 May 2026, DESNZ, the NCSC, the National Energy System Operator and Ofgem published the Energy Sector Cyber Security Strategy, a four-year plan from 2026 to 2030. Two of its commitments are about suppliers. By the end of 2027, the government will have built its capability to assess the energy supply chain and “influenced legislation that will enable us to directly regulate critical suppliers”. By the end of 2030, it “will have designated critical suppliers and scoped appropriate maturity targets for them”. That’s the same design financial services already has: a designated tier of critical suppliers, overseen directly as well as through the firms that use them.

Ofgem has moved in parallel for the operators it regulates. Its NIS guidance and CAF overlay for downstream gas and electricity expect operators to keep a supplier register, map their supply chain, assess supplier risk, put security obligations into contracts and keep monitoring suppliers over time. Operators set out an assurance strategy and an Assurance Programme Plan, report on their assurance activity, and assess themselves against each CAF outcome as achieved, partially achieved or not achieved, with evidence to back it up.

The legal route to direct supplier oversight is the Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill, introduced in November 2025. The strategy says the Bill’s proposed powers could, subject to Royal Assent, be used to drive resilience in the energy sector. At the time of writing (November 2026) the Bill is in its final stages in Parliament and hasn’t yet received Royal Assent.

Why the logic matters more than the instruments

DORA and the Bill are different laws for different sectors. What they share is the reasoning: in a critical sector, systemic risk sits less inside the regulated firm and more in the small number of suppliers, software providers and infrastructure operators the whole sector depends on. Financial services reached that conclusion after third-party outages showed how concentrated its dependencies had become. The energy strategy says the same thing in its own words: it wants a full understanding of the energy system “including critical suppliers”, its dependencies and its “areas of risk concentration”.

What energy can take from banking

Three lessons from financial services carry straight across.

  • The first is that the supplier register is the foundation for everything else. A register that lists contracts is a start. A register that shows which suppliers support which essential services, which have access to which systems, and which are hard to replace is what regulators end up asking for. Building it takes time, because the information sits with procurement, engineering, IT and operations, and rarely in one place.
  • The second is that contracts take years to change. Audit rights, security obligations, incident notification and exit support can only be added at renewal or by negotiation. An operator that starts adding them now will have most critical contracts covered by the time designation arrives. One that waits will be negotiating under time pressure.
  • The third is that concentration is easy to miss from inside one organisation. A supplier that looks manageable to each operator can sit behind a large part of the sector. That’s the reason regulators move to direct oversight, and it’s worth each operator asking which of its suppliers are also critical to its peers.

Our view

For an energy operator building or maturing its third-party function, the practical point is timing. Designation won’t arrive as a single deadline; in banking it came well after the rules were in place. The operators that start now on supplier-level evidence, contractual security terms and ongoing monitoring will be ready when designation reaches their suppliers. The banking sector has already shown what that work involves.