Defence platforms routinely stay in service for decades. The companies that made their parts often don’t last that long, or stop making those parts long before the platform retires.
When that happens, a support team goes looking for a replacement component. The original manufacturer no longer makes it. An independent broker can supply what looks like matching stock, with a certificate and a short delivery time. The problem seems solved, but nobody has established where the stock came from, how it has been stored, or whether it’s right for the application.
That purchase has changed the assurance model. The buyer now has to show authenticity and conformity through a route that’s quite different from the one it was designed around.
Defence platforms stay in service for decades, long after many of the companies that supplied their parts have moved on. Obsolescence management is the discipline of planning for that. IEC 62402:2019 is the international standard for it, and it explicitly addresses an organisation’s dependence on items supplied by others. It covers obsolescence policy, planning, design strategies and resolution across the life of an item.
Counterfeit avoidance has its own standards. SAE AS5553, now at revision E (2025), covers counterfeit electrical, electronic and electromechanical parts, including how requirements should flow down to the organisations that buy and integrate them. SAE AS6174 covers counterfeit materiel more generally. MOD has its own defence standard on avoiding counterfeit materiel, DEF STAN 05-135.
None of these is law. Whether they apply depends on the contract, so the first step is to check which ones the contract actually calls up, in which edition, and with which deliverables.
There’s a big difference between buying from the original manufacturer, from an authorised distributor, and from an independent broker. The question in each case is what that organisation can show about the specific stock being offered.
A certificate of conformity is part of the evidence. It matters who issued it, what it actually certifies, and whether it links to the lot, batch or serial numbers on the parts received. The supplier’s own sourcing controls matter too. Can it change source without approval? Does it treat authorised and non-authorised routes differently? What does it do when traceability is missing?
Changes at the original source need their own attention. An acquisition, closure or product-line exit raises questions about continued manufacture, ownership of technical data, access to tooling and end-of-life support. That makes obsolescence a third-party risk problem as well as an engineering one, because continued supply depends on organisations the buyer doesn’t control.
Obsolescence forecasting works best when it’s linked to supplier monitoring, so a product change notice and a change in a supplier’s circumstances reach the same decision-makers while there are still options.
A last-time buy needs a documented decision. Engineering, procurement, quality and support teams should look together at future demand, storage, shelf life, authenticity, funding, and the cost of buying too much or too little. A substitute part needs its own approval path, with the technical assessment, testing and configuration change it requires.
Controls worth having in place:
A good test of whether these work is to follow one recent purchase from source selection through receipt, inspection and release.
Start with the items already showing supply difficulty, uncertain provenance or dependence on a source that may exit. For each, name the technical authority and the commercial owner, and record the approved source, the alternatives, the evidence gaps and the decision needed before the next purchase.
Where non-authorised sourcing is proposed, make the decision on evidence and testing explicit. A delivery deadline shouldn’t become an unrecorded acceptance of authenticity risk. And when an emergency purchase succeeds, the next question is whether the organisation has reduced its dependence on a source that’s becoming less certain.
Obsolescence management has to follow the organisations supplying a component as well as the component itself. Early visibility gives better choices, and disciplined sourcing and traceability give a defensible basis for the choices that remain.
Sources: IEC, IEC 62402:2019 Obsolescence management; SAE International, AS5553E Counterfeit electrical, electronic and electromechanical (EEE) parts; avoidance, detection, mitigation and disposition (2025); SAE International, AS6174 Counterfeit materiel; assuring acquisition of authentic and conforming materiel; Ministry of Defence, DEF STAN 05-135 Avoidance of counterfeit materiel (via the Defence Equipment and Support standards site).