Skip to main content

TPRM Consulting

Energy · part 5

Forced labour in the energy transition supply chain

Solar panels, batteries and critical minerals bring a supply chain risk that oil and gas procurement wasn’t built for.

Clive Besterwitch, Founder and Director · Part 5 of 5

The modules for a new solar farm arrive on time, and the site goes live. Before the order was placed, procurement checked the module supplier’s financial standing, certifications and warranties, and the supplier signed a code of conduct promising no forced labour.

What nobody checked is where the polysilicon in those modules came from. It sits several tiers back in the supply chain, and the module supplier may not know either.

The rules are moving from reporting to market access

In the UK, section 54 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 requires commercial organisations doing business in the UK with total turnover of £36 million or more to publish a slavery and human trafficking statement each financial year. The statement describes the steps the organisation has taken in its business and supply chains. It’s a reporting duty. It doesn’t require a set level of due diligence, and it doesn’t ban any product.

The US went further. Under the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, US Customs and Border Protection applies a rebuttable presumption that goods mined, produced or manufactured wholly or partly in Xinjiang, or by an entity on the UFLPA Entity List, are made with forced labour and can’t be imported. The presumption has applied since 21 June 2022. An importer can only overcome it with clear and convincing evidence.

The EU Forced Labour Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2024/3015) applies from 14 December 2027. It prohibits placing products made with forced labour on the EU market, or exporting them, whatever the sector or country of origin and at any stage of production.

So the direction is from disclosure to market access. A product can be refused because of what happened several tiers back in its supply chain.

Why this is a third-party risk question

Oil and gas procurement grew up assessing contractors and equipment makers: safety records, competence, financial strength, quality. Energy transition projects bring in supply chains of a different kind, long and global, with key inputs such as polysilicon and battery minerals processed far from the final supplier. A code of conduct signed by a tier-one supplier tells you little about tier four. The supplier you contract with may be a reputable assembler that buys cells, wafers or cathode materials from others, who buy their inputs from others again. Each tier can change supplier without telling the one above. A declaration that was accurate when it was signed can stop being accurate within months.

What evidence looks like

The evidence needs to follow the material:

  • Traceability for the high-risk inputs (polysilicon, battery cathode materials, critical minerals) back to the processing site, beyond the final manufacturer.
  • Contract terms that require that traceability, allow audit or independent verification, and let you reject or remove products when the evidence fails.
  • A view of which projects depend on a single high-risk source, and what an import detention or market ban would do to the schedule.
  • Ongoing screening of suppliers and their upstream entities against forced labour lists and enforcement actions.

Traceability evidence is usually a chain of documents: purchase records, production records and shipping documents linking each tier to the next, ideally checked by someone independent of the supplier. It’s demanding to collect, and suppliers will push back. That’s why it needs to be a condition of the contract, agreed before the order is placed, and not a request made after the equipment has been shipped.

Bringing it into project delivery

Forced labour risk often sits with a sustainability or ethics team, while procurement and project teams make the buying decisions. That separation is where the risk gets missed. The questions above need to be part of supplier selection, with the same weight as price, delivery and quality, and the answers need to be visible to the project team that will carry the schedule risk if equipment is detained.

For projects already under way, the starting point is a list of the high-risk inputs, the suppliers providing them, and the evidence currently held. Gaps can then be closed at the next order or the next contract change, before the EU regulation applies.

Our view

For energy companies, forced labour risk is moving from the annual statement into procurement and project delivery. By the time the EU regulation applies, a solar or battery project with no traceability evidence will carry a real risk of stranded equipment, as well as a reputational one. The companies that build tier-n visibility into supplier selection now, before contracts are signed, will be in a much stronger position than those relying on a supplier’s declaration.