Most supplier tiering starts with spend, and most of the time that’s a reasonable place to start. A prime contractor reviews the financial health and delivery performance of its largest suppliers, and the dashboard looks reassuring. Then a specialist three tiers down announces that it will stop running a particular production process. Several apparently separate suppliers depend on that process, and the suggested alternative has never made the part in question.
We see this as a dependency problem that conventional supplier tiering hides. The real question is whether delivery can carry on without that organisation, facility, material or process. Annual spend can’t answer it.
UK defence policy now puts industrial resilience near the top of the agenda. The Strategic Defence Review was published in June 2025, and the Defence Industrial Strategy 2025, “Making Defence an Engine for Growth”, followed in September 2025, with a resilient UK industrial base as one of its aims. MOD’s earlier Defence Supply Chain Strategy, published in November 2022, already recognised the need to move beyond a focus on cost and efficiency.
These are policy documents, not supplier obligations. They set the direction. What a particular supplier has to do still depends on its contracts.
Europe is moving the same way. The European Commission published the first European Defence Industrial Strategy in March 2024. The European Defence Industry Programme followed as Regulation (EU) 2025/2643, adopted in December 2025, with measures to support the timely availability and supply of defence products. NATO updated its Defence Production Action Plan in February 2025. How far any of these touch a UK supplier depends on what it supplies, to whom, and under which funding arrangement.
A spend-based model answers a purchasing question: where does the money go? A resilience model has to answer a delivery question: what could stop an essential activity?
Take a small supplier that provides a specialist surface treatment. Its invoices may be modest, but its process may sit on the path to every accepted unit of a critical component. The consequence of losing it has nothing to do with its purchase value.
The same logic applies to energetics, specialist materials, components and test facilities. For each, the question is what makes it hard to replace, and whether that has been shown or only assumed.
Concentration also hides behind different supplier names. Several direct suppliers can all depend on the same specialist, or use the same test facility, without anyone at the prime seeing it. That’s only visible when dependencies are mapped across programmes, sites and purchasing teams together.
Start from a product, service or operational outcome and work backwards through what it takes to deliver it. That keeps the map tied to consequences, and avoids collecting a large supplier directory with no clear purpose.
A useful dependency record shows:
Uncertainty should be visible. A supplier that can’t name the manufacturer behind a component isn’t in the same position as one that has verified the production site and tested an alternative. Different kinds of concentration (shared ownership, shared geography, shared equipment, shared specialist staff) also fail in different ways, so they need different responses.
Smaller suppliers will be wary of disclosing who they buy from. Agree how the information will be held, used and shared before asking for it.
A name in a database isn’t an alternative. A simple exercise helps: assume the current source can’t supply the next delivery, then list every step needed to use the proposed replacement. That usually includes design approval, qualification, certification, testing, tooling, access to intellectual property and, in some cases, export permissions.
The exercise shows the difference between a source that exists and a source that’s ready. It also shows which decisions sit outside the buyer’s control, and who would need to make them.
Monitoring should follow the same logic. Watch for the things that would change the answer: a product line being withdrawn, a change of ownership, the loss of a specialist process or the closure of a test facility. Procurement, engineering, quality and programme teams should own the result together, with a named decision-maker for the dependencies that can’t be reduced quickly.
A supplier’s importance should reflect consequence and substitutability, as well as spend. A good map lets an organisation explain how delivery continues when a small, hard-to-replace supplier stops.
Sources: GOV.UK, Defence Industrial Strategy 2025: Making Defence an Engine for Growth (8 September 2025); GOV.UK, The Strategic Defence Review 2025 (2 June 2025); GOV.UK, Defence Supply Chain Strategy (15 November 2022); European Commission, A new European Defence Industrial Strategy (5 March 2024); EUR-Lex, Regulation (EU) 2025/2643 establishing the European Defence Industry Programme; NATO, Updated Defence Production Action Plan (2025).