A major sells its share of a late-life North Sea field to a smaller operator. The deal makes sense on both sides. The seller frees up capital, and the buyer gets production it can run at lower cost. The sale agreement includes an indemnity for decommissioning, and both legal teams sign off.
Five years later the buyer is in financial difficulty, and the field is close to the end of production. The indemnity is worth what the buyer can pay, which may be very little.
Decommissioning of offshore installations and pipelines on the UK continental shelf is governed by Part IV of the Petroleum Act 1998. The Secretary of State can serve section 29 notices requiring named parties to submit a decommissioning programme. Once a programme is approved, section 36 makes it “the duty of each of the persons who submitted it to secure that it is carried out”. Each of them carries the whole duty, so if one party can’t pay, the others still have to make sure the work is done, and then recover what they can from each other under their own agreements.
Selling doesn’t necessarily end the exposure. Section 34 lets the Secretary of State add someone to that duty if they fall, or have fallen at any time since the first section 29 notice was given, within the categories of party the Act covers. For some categories, that’s only possible where an existing duty-holder has failed or may fail to carry out the programme. In practice, a seller that held an interest after the first notice can be brought back in if the buyer can’t pay. Indemnities and decommissioning security agreements share the cost between the parties, but they don’t bind the Secretary of State.
OPRED handles decommissioning programmes for the Secretary of State, and the Act requires the North Sea Transition Authority to be consulted where a proposed change to a programme is likely to affect its cost.
Most third-party programmes look at suppliers. In late-life assets the counterparties that can hurt you most are often co-venturers and buyers. They’re rarely treated as third parties, because the relationship sits with the commercial, legal and finance teams.
Responsibility is clear enough; the gap is in how the risk is watched. Commercial and legal teams are good at negotiating the deal. They’re less often set up to keep watching a counterparty’s financial health for years after completion. Third-party risk functions do that routinely for critical suppliers, and the same discipline applies here.
The risk also runs down the supply chain. Decommissioning depends on specialist contractors for well plugging and abandonment, heavy lift, removal and disposal. If a contractor fails partway through a campaign, the programme slips and costs rise, and the duty stays with the parties named in the programme.
Due diligence before the deal is the easy part to get right, because everyone is paying attention. The harder part is what happens afterwards. A buyer’s position can change quickly: a fall in commodity prices, a failed refinancing, a problem on another asset, or a change of ownership. None of these will necessarily reach the seller unless someone is looking.
Ongoing monitoring of a buyer or co-venturer can draw on published accounts, credit information, news and regulatory notices, and on the information rights written into the sale and joint operating agreements. The aim is to spot early signs of stress while there’s still time to act, for example by calling for additional security or revisiting the decommissioning cost estimate.
For specialist contractors, the questions are closer to standard supplier risk: financial strength, capacity, dependence on a small number of vessels or crews, and the availability of alternatives if a contractor drops out.
For anyone holding or selling a late-life interest, the practical questions are these:
Pick one critical function, such as payments, and trace it end to end with the people who run it. Compare what you find with the register and the supplier inventory. The differences are your priority list: services nobody recorded, suppliers whose rating doesn’t reflect what they support, and dependencies that sit with a subcontractor nobody has assessed. Then repeat for the next function.
A good test is the supervisor’s question. If a named provider failed, how long would it take to list every function affected? Hours means the map works. Days means the register describes contracts more than services.