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TPRM Consulting

Energy · part 3

When inspection data becomes third-party risk

In-line inspection is an assurance chain run mostly by suppliers, and the operator keeps the accountability.

Clive Besterwitch, Founder and Director · Part 3 of 5

For most of the history of pipeline integrity management, the inspection contractor was treated as a technical service provider: select the tool, complete the run, analyse the signals, deliver the report. That no longer describes how much the operator relies on it.

A modern in-line inspection programme is an assurance chain. It can involve a tool vendor, field technicians, data analysts, non-destructive examination specialists, excavation contractors, corrosion engineers, fitness-for-service specialists, and the software in which successive runs are aligned and compared. The operator remains accountable for the integrity decision, but much of the evidence behind it is generated, interpreted or handled outside the organisation.

Why the detail matters

An in-line inspection doesn’t produce a simple list of defects. It produces a probabilistic picture of pipeline condition. Magnetic flux leakage, ultrasonic, electromagnetic acoustic transducer, geometry and inertial-mapping tools each have different capabilities and limits. The right system depends on the threats being assessed (metal loss, cracking, dents, deformation, weld features or movement) and on the physical and operating conditions of the line. Inspection also isn’t a one-off: it runs from a baseline after commissioning through periodic runs, and a single campaign often involves several tool passes.

This is where supplier assurance and engineering assurance meet.

Inspection contracts describe tool performance as a probability of detection and a sizing accuracy, stated at a confidence level for defined defect types. Those claims only mean something when their conditions are understood. A stated probability of detection doesn’t mean that share of every possible defect will be found. The claim relates to a defined tool, feature population, performance specification and operating envelope. Tool speed, cleanliness, wall thickness, geometry, sensor coverage, defect shape and analysis practice all affect whether the claimed performance is achieved on a given run. That’s why API Standard 1163 deals with qualification of the whole in-line inspection system, not only the tool.

Where the chain can break

Each link in the chain is a point where the evidence can degrade without anyone noticing.

The tool may be capable, but the run may fall outside the conditions it was qualified for: too fast, too dirty, or through a section with geometry the tool handles poorly. The field data may be complete, but the analysis may be done by a subcontracted team whose competence for this technology and anomaly type hasn’t been checked. The report may be accurate, but the raw data behind it may sit in a proprietary format that only the supplier can read. Each of these is a supplier issue that ends up as an integrity issue.

What third-party risk should ask

“Is the supplier certified?” isn’t enough. The better questions are these. Is the technology demonstrably capable against this pipeline’s threat profile? Did the run stay inside the qualified envelope? Are the analysts competent for this technology and anomaly class? Can the operator independently verify and challenge the result?

That last question bites when field findings don’t match the reported data. Direct examination and non-destructive evaluation at selected digs are feedback on supplier and system performance as well as repair work. Comparing reported dimensions with measured ones shows whether the inspection met its specification, and whether the rest of the reported anomalies can be relied on.

A mature approach follows the evidence through the whole integrity decision, past the point where the report is delivered. It should establish:

  • Threat-to-tool traceability: a documented reason why the chosen technology and configuration suit the degradation mechanisms being assessed.
  • Control of the performance specification: agreed detection, identification, sizing and location requirements, with the operating conditions and exclusions attached to them.
  • Competence at each judgement point: evidence for field execution, signal analysis, anomaly classification, non-destructive examination and integrity engineering, beyond corporate accreditation.
  • Subcontractor transparency: who performs each stage, where specialist analysis is subcontracted, and how competence and quality are controlled beyond the prime contractor.
  • Data lineage and retention: access to raw and processed data, run logs, analyst decisions, software and algorithm versions, feature-matching rules, revision history and final reports, in formats that stay usable after the contract ends.
  • Independent challenge and validation: a defined process for reconciling dig and NDE findings with reported performance, investigating outliers and deciding whether wider reanalysis is needed.
  • Continuity of evidence: the contractual right and the technical means to compare future runs with historic data, including after a supplier change, acquisition, product withdrawal or loss of key staff.

The last point is often underestimated. Inspection data gains value over time. One run gives a view of condition; aligned runs support estimates of corrosion growth, feature development and changing risk. If historic raw data, analysis assumptions or compatible formats stay with one provider, a technical dependency becomes a concentration risk. The operator can own the report and still be unable to reproduce, reinterpret or transfer the evidence behind it.

Who should own this

In most operators, inspection contracts are owned by integrity engineering, and third-party risk sees them, if at all, as a procurement file. That split leaves gaps. Integrity engineers know whether the evidence is technically sound. Procurement knows the contract. Third-party risk knows how to test a supplier’s subcontracting, data rights, continuity and concentration. The strongest approach brings the three together on the inspection suppliers that matter most, so each sees what the others are checking.

Accountability doesn't move

Regulation 13 of the Pipelines Safety Regulations 1996 is short: “The operator shall ensure that a pipeline is maintained in an efficient state, in efficient working order and in good repair.” That duty stays with the operator, whoever produced the inspection data.

None of this means inspection suppliers should be treated with suspicion. Their specialist capability is indispensable. But a technically impressive report is not a transfer of accountability.

Our view

Pipeline operators should treat inspection evidence as a critical third-party service in its own right. The fix is a connected control model, where procurement, integrity engineering, data governance and third-party risk can show how a supplier-generated signal became an operator-owned decision, and how that decision would still stand if the original supplier were gone.

Sources: legislation.gov.uk, Pipelines Safety Regulations 1996, regulation 13; API Standard 1163, In-line Inspection Systems Qualification.