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TPRM Consulting

Energy · part 2

The attack surface that didn't exist a decade ago

Vendor remote access now links an IT compromise to physical OT consequences.

Clive Besterwitch, Founder and Director · Part 2 of 5

Most industrial control systems running in a refinery, compressor station or offshore platform were never designed to be connected to the internet. SCADA and distributed control systems built in the 1990s and 2000s assumed physical and network isolation: a closed environment, monitored locally, with nothing exposed to attack from outside. That assumption no longer holds anywhere in the sector.

Remote monitoring, predictive maintenance platforms, cloud-connected SCADA dashboards and vendor-managed remote access have joined OT and IT together. The result is a kind of third-party risk with consequences other sectors rarely face. A compromise that starts in a vendor’s IT environment can reach a live industrial control system, and the damage can be physical and operational as well as lost data.

How vendor access usually grows

Vendor access into OT rarely arrives as a single decision. A control system supplier needs to diagnose a fault, so a remote connection is set up. A maintenance contractor needs data for a predictive model, so a gateway is installed. A software update service needs to reach field devices, so a route is opened through the firewall. Each connection has a good reason and an owner at the time it’s created.

Years later, the operator may have many such connections, set up by different teams, under different contracts, with different controls. Some are still in daily use. Some haven’t been used since the project that created them. The supplier staff who use them change, and the operator may not know who they are. This is how an attack surface grows without anyone choosing it.

What the frameworks expect

The NCSC’s Cyber Assessment Framework, now at version 4.0 (August 2025), has a supply chain principle: understand and manage the security risks that come from depending on external suppliers. Ofgem’s CAF overlay for downstream gas and electricity applies it to the sector. It expects a supplier register that identifies which suppliers have remote access, security obligations written into supplier agreements, and a way of assuring that supplier connections are managed in line with those agreements. Ofgem’s approach is outcome-based. It doesn’t prescribe a single architecture, so each operator has to show how its own controls meet the outcome.

Why oil and gas is exposed

The vendors with legitimate, contracted access to OT environments are numerous, specialised and often small. Field device manufacturers, SCADA software providers, remote diagnostics contractors, firmware update services and instrumentation calibration specialists all need some connection into control environments to do their jobs. Each is a separate route in, and an intrusion there is measured in process safety, environmental release or physical damage.

There is a standard to assess against. ISA/IEC 62443 is written for industrial automation and control systems, and the ISASecure certification schemes built on it include Component Security Assurance for products, System Security Assurance for control systems, and Security Development Lifecycle Assurance for a supplier’s development process.

We haven’t found reliable public data on how many oil and gas suppliers hold that certification. What we do see is that when a supplier has none, the default is often a generic IT security questionnaire, which was never designed for the environment it’s meant to protect.

What an OT-specific assessment looks like

A generic IT questionnaire asks about password policies, data encryption and staff training. Those matter, but they miss what makes OT access dangerous. An OT-specific assessment starts from the connection itself and works outwards:

  • Which supplier staff can connect, from where, and how is each session authorised, recorded and ended?
  • Does the connection reach only the systems the supplier needs, or a wider part of the control network?
  • How does the supplier protect the devices and accounts it uses to connect, given that a compromise there becomes a route into your plant?
  • How does the supplier develop and test the software and firmware it installs, and how does it tell you about vulnerabilities in its products?
  • What happens to the access when the contract ends, the project finishes or a member of the supplier’s staff leaves?

Ask for evidence behind each answer. A diagram of the connection, a log of recent sessions and a sample of the supplier’s vulnerability notices tell you more than a signed questionnaire.

Start with the access you already have

For most operators, the first step isn’t a new assessment process. It’s finding out what access exists today. That means matching the network routes into OT with the suppliers who use them and the contracts that cover them. Any connection without a current owner, a current contract or recent use is a candidate for closing. Any supplier with access but no security obligations in its contract goes on the list for the next renewal.

Our view

That gap between the standard the sector has and the assurance many supply chains apply will narrow as procurement starts to demand OT-specific evidence. Ofgem already expects security requirements to be considered in the procurement of products and services, and set out in procurement documents. Operators that build OT-specific vendor assessment now, separate from and more technical than standard IT due diligence, will be ready when it becomes a formal requirement.

Sources: NCSC, Cyber Assessment Framework v4.0 and changelog; Ofgem, NIS Guidance v3.0 (paragraph 1.9) and CAF Overlay (A4.a Supply chain); ISASecure, certification schemes (CSA, SSA, SDLA).